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Manfred BierwischPreface
In hindsight, the debate about presupposition following Frege’s discovery that the referential
function of names and deﬁnite descriptions depended on the fulﬁllment of an existence and a
uniqueness condition was curiously limited for a very long time. On the one hand, it was only
in the 1960s that linguists began to take an interest and showed that presupposition was an all-
pervasive phenomenon far beyond this philosophers’ pet deﬁnite descriptions. And on the other
hand, and this is our real concern, it is now only too obvious that the uniqueness condition is too
restrictive to be applicable to the general case. An utterance of “The cat is on the mat” should not
imply that there is only one cat and one mat in the whole world. The obvious move is to limit the
uniqueness condition to some notion of utterance context.
Theories of context-dependent propositions began to sprout in the 1970s (with Gazdar, Kart-
tunen, and Stalnaker as the main protagonists), but a full-ﬂedged notion of a context which
evolves not only as we go through a sequence of sentences, but also while we analyze the in-
ternal structure of sentences, was only available with the advent of dynamic semantics. Dynamic
semantics came into being through the need to account for anaphoric reference. But before long,
van der Sandt showed that the problem of linking the pronoun to a suitable antecedent was but a
variant of the all-embracing problem of presupposition projection.
So it is hardly a decade ago that presupposition theory has been cast into a promising theoretical
form. And as this provided an inspiring starting point for further research, we thought that, at
the turn of the century, the time had come to discuss what the new theory had taught us and
which promising further perspectives had been opened up. This was the motivation behind the
conference on “Presupposition” which we convened in Stuttgart in October 2000, and which
gave rise to the papers collected in this volume. The conference was funded by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, which we gratefully acknowledge.
Undoubtedly, presupposition theory is a major chapter in the success story of dynamic seman-
tics. A conference on the topic thus also seemed to us the ideal birthday present for one of the
founding fathers of dynamic semantics, our teacher and friend Hans Kamp, on his 60th birth-day.
To him we dedicate the volume as an expression of our gratitude for his untiring effort to make
us understand.
RB, Th.E.Z. and UR
Stuttgart, July 20061
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1 Opening
In spite of continuous debate over the appropriate characterization of various details, there is
little doubt that the semantic component frequently represented as BECOME is a crucial element
in the structure of natural language. Standard examples illustrating the pertinent phenomena are
minimal pairs like those in (1) and (2), differing by the presence of BECOME in (b) where (a) just
lacks it:
(1) a. Eve is an actress.
The crew slept.
The shop is open.
Some of the kids were sick.
b. Eve becomes an actress.
The crew fell asleep.
The shop opens.
Some of the kids got sick.
(2) a. Hans schlief. (Hans slept)
Eva schwieg. (Eva was silent)
Max ist wach. (Max is awake)
Er ist Buddhist.(He is a Buddhist)
b. Hans schlief ein. (Hans fell asleep)
Eva verstummte. (Eva became silent)
Max erwacht. (Max wakes up)
Er wird Buddhist.(He becomes a Buddhist)
There are various diagnostics and criteria identifying the relevant properties, e.g. with respect
to the temporal structure. Thus usually the (a)-cases allow for durational adverbials, but not the
(b)-cases. The present paper will focus on another, well-known aspect, viz. the presupposition
introduced by the occurrence of BECOME, according to which e.g. Eva verstummte presupposes
that she spoke before, while no such requirement comes with Eva was silent.2 Presuppositions and Discourse
In what follows, I will brieﬂy recapitulate the standard analysis of BECOME, turning then to some
of the peculiarities related to its presuppositional aspect. A number of more complex phenomena
will then be considered on the basis of this discussion.
2 Standard Assumptions
The most obvious function of BECOME is to characterize so called inchoative verbs like die,
get up, or the examples in (1.b) and (2.b), including the corresponding causative verbs like kill,
denoting the causation of an event expressed by an inchoative verb.1 These change-of-state verbs
(or 2state verbs in the sense of Klein (1994)) denote the transition from a source state s to a
target state s0. The basic assumptionstaking care of these conditions have been formulated e.g. in
Dowty (1979) by means of the operator BECOME as indicated in (3), where φ is the target-state
and I, J, K are time intervals, schematically indicated in (4):
(3) [ BECOME φ ] is true at I if and only if
(i). there is an interval J containing the initial bound of I such that ¬φ is true at J, and
(ii). there is an interval K containing the ﬁnal bound of I such that φ is true at K.
(4) J K z }| { z }| {
| ] [ |
| {z }
I
Therearetwoproblemstobeclariﬁed withrespecttothisaccount.First,as itstands,Imayextend
overarbitrary parts of the source as well as the target state, such that The cat died could apply to a
situation that includes arbitrary parts of the cat’s lifetime and/or arbitrary periods of the cat’s not
being aliveanymore. Forthis reason, Dowty contemplatesthe extensionof (3) by a condition(iii)
that there is no interval I0 that meets condition (i) and (ii), i.e. I must be the smallest interval that
includes the bound of J and K. Dowty does not suggest to adopt condition (iii) though, because it
leads to difﬁcultiesin viewofthesecond problemto beclariﬁed, which has todo withtheinterval
I00 between the source and the target state. If one relies on strictly two-valued logic, no interval I00
between J and K is possible, as either φ or ¬φ must hold – there is no transition. Together with
condition (iii), any change of state would be strictly momentary. The solution Dowty suggests
with respect to these two problems is, ﬁrst to discard condition (iii) in favor of some sort of
Gricean maxim, which picks out a short, but non-empty interval appropriate under conditions
of encyclopedic or common sense knowledge, and second to acknowledge intervening time-
1 It might be noted that in many cases, English inchoative verbs and their corresponding causatives are
homophonous (giving rise to the somewhat misleading term “ergative verb”), differing, however by the
presence of the causative factor and the pertinent argument – as in He opened the shop vs. The shop
opened. I will have to return to this issue below, noting for the time being, however, that the relevant
distinctions and relations carry over from inchoatives to their causative counterparts.BECOME and its Presuppositions 3
intervals with undecided (or non-two-valued) truth conditions.2 On this account, verbs like die
or leave are correctly construed as specifying neither the duration of nor the properties holding
at the interval between the initial state ¬φ and the target state φ, nor exactly when ¬φ and φ
begin or end. As a matter of fact, what is ﬁxed by an utterance like (5) is merely the transition (at
some time before the utterance and at the same day) from Bill’s being at some contextually given
location to his not being there, without any speciﬁcation whether this took place by walking or
driving, by bike or by plane, whether it was a rapid or slow event, etc:
(5) Bill left today.
Using notational conventions of an event-based semantics with events e and states s as sorts of
eventualities in the sense of Bach (1986), the Semantic Form of (5) could thus be represented as
in (6), where T(e) and T(u) indicate the time of the event and the time of utterance, respectively,
and v is a contextually speciﬁed place parameter:
(6) ∃e[[T(e) < T(u)
| {z }
] ∧ [T(e) ⊂ DAY ∧ T(u) ⊂ DAY
| {z }
] ∧ e : [BECOME¬[LOC[Bill AT v]]
| {z }
]]
|Past| |today| |Bill leave v|
In the sense of deﬁnition (3), the actual event e, instantiating the proposition |Bill leave v| could
be characterized as in (7), where ￿ indicates temporal overlap mentioned before:
(7) If e, s, and s0 are eventualities with T(e) = I, T(s) = J, T(s0) = K, where T(e) ￿ T(s), T(e)
￿ T(s0) and T(s)
￿ T(s0), then Bill leave denotes an event e such that:
e : [s : LOC : [Bill AT v]
| {z }
) ∧ s
0 : ¬[LOC : [Bill AT v]]
| {z }
source state target state
This leads to the following general consequences:
(i) A change of state or BECOME-event e need (and frequently does) not have any other charac-
terization than that given by its bounds. In other words, the nature of the transition determined by
BECOME is characterized exclusively by the boundaries it connects. Verbs like leave, get, arrive,
die do in fact provide no other speciﬁcation of the transition between two states.
(ii) There is, moreover, no speciﬁcation of the time interval I0 between the boundaries of T(s) and
T(s0). I0 might be empty, as in instantaneous transitions like the atom lost a particle, or it may
have substantial extension as in the towel got dry where for a certain time span I0 the towel is not
dry, but not as wet as before either: It is just not deﬁned.
2 As Dowty shows, the choice of intervals can be made sufﬁciently precise by means of an interval-
semantics, which I need not pursue here, as the details of time structure are not my primary concern. The
undecided truth-value of the interval between ¬φ and φ need not concern us here either, as it is the status
of I rather than I00, that we have to deal with.4 Presuppositions and Discourse
(iii) The speciﬁcation of the transition by means of its boundaries noted in (i) is in fact restricted
to the target state, the source state being completely derivable as the negation of the target state.3
(Since the target state in (7) is a negated state itself, the source state must, of course, be a positive
condition.) Hence the deﬁning information in a BECOME-event is the speciﬁcation of the target
state.
While these generalizations can be read off more or less directly from the characterization in (3)
and the illustration in (7), the following observations bring in additional facts:
(iv) The restrictions noted in (i) and (iii) must not be construed as excluding substantial speciﬁ-
cation of the transition – or even as denying the transition as the very core of the BECOME-event.
There are in fact verbs that characteristically specify the transition in various ways. German
verbs of dying like ertrinken (be drowned), ersticken (choke), verhungern (starve), verdursten
(die with thirst) illustrate the point, to which I will return from a different perspective. What
is to be noted here is the fact that qualiﬁcations of this sort are not due to the change-of-state
conditions expressed by BECOME.
(v) It is furthermore well known that the transition identiﬁed by BECOME can be subject to
temporal localization and delimitation, as in (8) and (9), but not – with two qualiﬁcations to be
discussed immediately – to durational qualiﬁcation, as shown in (10):
(8) a. The shop opened at noon.
b. Das Geschäft öffnete um zwölf.
(9) a. The cat died in/within two hours.
b. Die Katze starb in/innerhalb von zwei Stunden.
(10) a. *The cat died (for) two hours.
b. *Die Katze ist zwei Stunden (lang) ertrunken.
(vi) The different status of source and target state noted in (ii) has further aspects, one of which is
directly related to the qualiﬁcations just mentioned: Durative adverbials combining with change
of stateverbs, as in (11) and (12), can be accommodatedby shiftingthespeciﬁcation they express
from the event to the target state:
(11) a. The shop closed for two hours.
b. Der Laden hat zwei Stunden geschlossen.
(12) a. Eve came to London for some days.
b. Eve kam (für) einige Tage nach London.
3 Apparent counterexamples like melt, where the source state is more speciﬁc than just the negation of the
target state will be taken up below.BECOME and its Presuppositions 5
Cases like (11) cannot be interpreted as denoting a process of two hours, nor, of course, a source
state of two hours, but only as determining the duration of the resulting state. This emphasizes
its prominence mentioned in (iii) from another perspective.
Before I get to the main aspect of the asymmetry to be pursued here, I will mention the other
qualiﬁcation hinted at in (v), which takes care of durative adverbials modifying change of state
verbs in cases like (13) and (14):
(13) a. For several hours, visitors entered the hall.
b. Mehrere Stunden lang betraten Besucher das Haus.
(14) a. Captives broke out of this prison for quite a while.
b. Die ganze Zeit sind Häftlinge aus diesem Gefängnis ausgebrochen.
Here the durative adverbial applies to a process that is made up by the iterated change, induced,
among other things, by the plurality of the Theme. We will have to return to this problem as
we proceed. For the time being, it should be noted that the durative adverbial does not specify
the change of state per se, determined by BECOME, but either its result or a kind of process
constituted by its repetition.
To sum up the main points of the received analysis: Change-of-state- or BECOME-events nec-
essarily involve a source state s, a target state s0, and a transition e, where s precedes s0 and is
contained in the complement of s0, and e overlaps with s and s0. The substantial information of
the change of state is given by the speciﬁcation of the target state s0.
3 Assertion, Presupposition, and Implication
Turning now to the presuppositional aspect of BECOME, we notice a three-way distinction be-
tween e, s, and s0 in (7) – or equivalently I, J, and K in (4) – in terms of assertion (or more
generally: condition), presupposition (or precondition)4, and implication (or consequence). Evi-
dence for this claim comes from the usual criteria, to be reviewed brieﬂy.
First, the presuppositionalcharacter of the initial or source state can be seen from the fact that as-
serting, denying, or questioning the transition all require the source state to be met, as illustrated
in (15)(a) to (c), all of which presuppose that Bill was in his ofﬁce before:
4 A terminological remark might be in place. The phenomena usually lumped together as presuppositions
have been treated under various perspectives. A systematic account has been developed a. o. in Karttunen
and Peters (1979), where “conventional implicature” is used instead of “presupposition”. To the extent
that this is more than just a terminological difference, I will be concerned here with presupposition in the
sense more recently discussed e.g. in Kamp (2001) and the references given there. In what follows, I will
also adopt notational conventions to represent presuppositions proposed in Kamp (2001).6 Presuppositions and Discourse
(15) a. Bill left his ofﬁce.
b. Bill didn’t leave his ofﬁce.
c. Did Bill leave his ofﬁce?
The presupposition in question is supposed to hold also if the question (c) is negated by (b). It
can onlybesuspended by an explicitdenial,usuallycalled “presuppositionprotest”,as in(16)(a),
while (16)(b) is out, as it explicitly violates the conditions for a change of state:
(16) a. Bill didn’t leave his ofﬁce, as he wasn’t in at all.
b. #Bill left his ofﬁce, but he wasn’t in at all.
Second, the resulting or target state is a (necessary) consequence, implied by the transition, as
indicated by the contradiction in (17)(a). But it does not imply a transition, just as the presuppo-
sition does not require a change to take place. In other words, the target state may hold, even if
no previous change takes place, as borne out by the acceptability of (17)(b):
(17) a. #Bill left his ofﬁce, but he was not out of it afterwards.
b. Bill was not in his ofﬁce, in fact he was out all day (hence he didn’t leave it).
Finally, the condition proper, the change from source to target, is satisﬁed if and only if the pre-
supposition, the consequence, and the transition hold. In other words, if either the presupposition
or theconsequenceis not met,no changeis possibleand theconditionfails, as (16)(b)and (17)(a)
show. The negation of the change, on the other hand, is true if the consequence is false, while the
presupposition holds – according to default conditions. In other words, the negation of BECOME
is equivalentto theassertion that the source statepersists. Hence (18)(a) holds if and only if (18b)
holds:
(18) a. Bill didn’t leave his ofﬁce this morning.
b. Bill remained in his ofﬁce this morning.
If, on the other hand, by way of presupposition protest the source state is negated, the negation
of the change can only be true if the target state holds without relevant change – the normal
interpretation of (16)(a). In other words, the absence of a change requires either the source or the
target state to persist, the former being the default case that can be switched to the second only
by means of (explicit or implicit) presupposition protest.
According to standard deﬁnition, a proposition φ presupposes ψ, if and only if φ implies ψ and
¬φ also impliesψ. In order to account for the observationsjustdiscussed, we might provisionally
modify the deﬁnition in the way indicated in (19):
(19) φ presupposes ψ =def φ is true only if ψ is true and ¬φ is true only if ψ is true, except ψ is
explicitly rejected.BECOME and its Presuppositions 7
With this proviso, the asymmetry between the presupposed source state and the implied target
state can be accommodated by the following modiﬁcation of (3):
(20) [ BECOME φ ] is true at I if and only if
(i) there is an interval K containing the ﬁnal bound of I with φ implied to be true at K,
(ii) there is an interval J containing the initial bound of I with ¬φ presupposed to hold at J.
This characterization has obvious consequences for the information to be speciﬁed for lexical
entries as well as other constructions involving BECOME: Once the target state is determined, the
presupposed source state is automatically deﬁned and need therefore not be speciﬁed as lexical
information. In other words, while lexically induced presuppositions must somehow be speciﬁed
as a characteristic property of e. g. factive verbs like grasp or regret (as opposed to non-factive
verbslikeclaimorassume)5 orparticlesliketoo,also6,andagain7,thepresuppositioninducedby
the inchoativity of verbs like come, leave, enter, die, open etc. are fully predictable and need not
lexically be indicated. The same holds for causative verbs such as bring, kill, or transitive open
specifying the causation of a change of state: In order to bring about the change in question,
the source state to be changed must be met in the ﬁrst place. For the same reason, resultative
constructions like (21)(a) are automatically associated with a presupposed source state indicated
by (21)(b), which is not a presupposition of its parts, as can be seen from (21)(c) and (d):
(21) a. Max wiped the table clean (#although it was clean).
b. The table was not clean.
c. Max wiped the table (although it was clean).
d. The table was clean (#and it was not clean).
If no additional conditions interfere, wipe is just an activity without particular presuppositions or
speciﬁed result. And the adjective clean does not make any presupposition either.8 The causative
5 The presuppositional character of factive verbs has ﬁrst been observed by Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970)
and was subsequently discussed in a large number of different approaches. The point to be noted here is the
fact that it is a matter of idiosyncratic, lexical information whether a factive presupposition is associated
with a given verb or not, while no such idiosyncracy holds for the initial state of an inchaotive verb.
6 See Reis and Rosengren (1997) for a recent survey of the pertinent facts. Even though the paper is pri-
marily concerned with the problem of how the particle determines its focus, it necessarily deals implicitly
with the lexical basis of the presupposition the particle induces.
7 There is an extensive discussion about this particle, summarized e.g. in Dowty (1979), Kamp and
Roßdeutscher (1994), von Stechow (1996), which focuses, however, on the scope assigned to the par-
ticle, from which the presupposition it induces is then derived. – I will take up one aspect of this particle
in Section 7 below.
8 For adjectives, the role of presuppositions is in general less obvious and more controversial than for
verbs. Thus whether e.g. a type crossings like red idea exempliﬁes a presupposition violation of the ad-
jective, which requires reference to a physical object, might be a matter of dispute. In any case, presup-
positions of adjectives are not excluded in principle, and elements like silent are naturally construed as
presupposing animacy. On this background, it isn’t just a triviality that clean has no presupposition, as it
applies to physical objects, processes, or even abstract entities like clean measures.8 Presuppositions and Discourse
verb clean on the other hand, appearing e.g. in Max cleaned the table does, of course, automati-
cally induce the presupposition indicated in (21)(b), due to the component BECOME it contains.
The way in which causative verbs like clean and resultativeconstructions like wipe clean acquire
the semantic components CAUSE and BECOME with their interpretive consequences is systemat-
ically discussed in Wunderlich (2000) and Bierwisch (2002).
In order to spell out the presuppositional aspect of BECOME more explicitly, including related
elements with their consequences, some remarks on notational conventions seem to be in order.
4 Lexical Representation of Presuppositions
In Kamp (2001), a systematic distinction is made between representation, computation and jus-
tiﬁcation of presuppositions. To begin with, an explicit account of their representation is needed,
which then allows to clarify the computation of presuppositions, i.e. the way in which they arise
on the basis of lexical information and compositional semantics. The justiﬁcation of a presuppo-
sition is then concerned with the problem of how it is either satisﬁed within the given context,
or how the context is to be modiﬁed in order to accommodate the presuppositional requirement.
According to a revealing observation developed in van der Sandt (1992) and adopted in Kamp
(2001), justiﬁcation of a presupposition by previous or inferred conditions is in essential respects
identical to the relation of anaphoric elements to their antecedent. In this section, I will sketch
minimal assumptions about the representation of lexical presuppositions, which in turn requires
a general format for the representation of lexical information. I will then turn to the computation
of presuppositions as far as they depend on BECOME and related elements.
To begin with, we have to recognize that a lexical entry E must provide at least three types of
information: First an array of phonetic features determining the contribution of E to the Phonetic
Form PF of the expressions it occurs in; second a complex structure representing the Semantic
Form SF of E determining the contribution of E to the semantic interpretation (or meaning) of
the expressions it occurs in; and third a speciﬁcation of the Grammatical Form GF deﬁning the
combinatorial requirements that guarantee the correspondence between PF and SF for complex
expressions build up from E. More Speciﬁcally, GF has two components sometimes called Cate-
gorization Cat and Subcategorization or Argument Structure AS, where Cat is a structured set of
morpho-syntactic features deﬁning the grammatical properties of E as a head, while AS speciﬁes
therequirementsE imposesonitsco-constituents.Each ofthesecomponentsand theirinteraction
can be elaborated in various ways. For obvious reasons, I have little to say here about PF. As to
Cat, I will rely on familiar conventions about morphological and lexical categorization by means
of binary features. The representation of AS and SF is based on standard assumptions about type
systems with lambda abstraction. More speciﬁcally, SF is a functor-argument-structure made up
from constants and variables, where variables are bound, substituted, or interpreted according to
conditions of formal or semantic and situational context, while constants are subject to (more
or less invariant) conceptual interpretation9. Of particular interest in the present context is the
9 To make this interpretation explicit is an extremely complex and ramiﬁed task that has to cope with
rather different types of problems that can only occasionally be touched here. One type of interpretation,
however, is indicated by the treatment of the functor BECOME in (20).BECOME and its Presuppositions 9
binding of variables by lambda-abstractors that constitute Argument Positions in AS, relating
the variables in question to the conditions imposed by the complements a lexical head combines
with. To that effect, Argument Positions are usually associated with morpho-syntactic features
deﬁning requirements on the categorization of the constituent that is to saturate the position.10
Thus AS participates in the morpho-syntactic as well as the semantic information of E and con-
stitutes in a way the interface between its syntactic and semantic structure. A simpliﬁed example
illustrating the ingredients just mentioned would be the entry (22) for the adjective open:
(22) / open / [+N, +V] λx (OPEN x)
PF Cat AS | {z } SF
GF
The one-place predicate OPEN is to be understood as a short-hand for a fairly complex condition
representing free access or passage to or by the argument represented by the variable x. This
variable, bound by the entry’s only Argument Position λx, is to be speciﬁed either by the subject
of a copulative construction with open as its predicate (as in the window was open) or by the
head noun of an attributive construction with open as its modiﬁer (as in an open window).
We get closer to issues speciﬁcally related to our present interests, if we consider entries that
account for open as an inchoative and as a causative verb, related of course to the adjective just
discussed. The pertinent entries are given in (23)(a) and (b), respectively:
(23) a. / open / [+V, -N] λx λe [e: [BECOME [OPEN x]]]
b. / open / [+V, -N] λx λy λe [e: [[ACT y] [CAUSE [BECOME [OPEN x]]]]]
A number of comments are in place here. First, within SF a variable “e” for eventualities is
assumed, which is then – along the lines familiar from DRT-representations – associated with
a proposition it instantiates, by the colon “:”. Formally, then, the colon is a relational operator
that turns a proposition and an individual into a proposition11. Second, the event variable just
mentioned is bound by the position “λe” in AS, which differs from other argument positions in
10 The most familiar conditions in this respect are Case features distinguishing subject, direct and oblique
object. Other conditions identify ﬁnite and inﬁnite complement clauses, or various types of predicates of
copulative constructions. There are important generalizations controlling this aspect of AS, which I cannot
pursue here. For a more systematic exposition of these matters, which are not in the focus of the present
discussion, see e.g. Bierwisch (1997), Wunderlich (2000), and references given there.
11 In Bierwisch (1997) and elsewhere I have used an operator INST indicating the instantiation of a propo-
sition by an eventuality in much the same way. An alternative proposal with ultimately the same effect
is made in Wunderlich (1997), where CAUSE, BECOME (and various other semantic elements) are treated
as propositional operators that are relativized to eventualities, incorporating, in a way, the effect of the
colon represented here as a separate operator. – The term “eventuality” is used in the sense proposed by
Bach (1986), covering both events and states. Notationally, I will adopt the widespread practice using “e”
as a variable for eventualities in general, and “s” as a variable to mark states, whenever the distinction is
relevant. It should be noted however, that the logical type of eventualities covers events as well as states
and processes as sortal distinctions within the same type.10 Presuppositions and Discourse
systematic ways, essentially due to the categorization of verbs by the feature combination [+V,
-N] in Cat. In other words, reference to eventualities, syntactically anchored in a particular argu-
ment position, is a category-speciﬁc property of verbs. The role of this event position is directly
related to the clause-speciﬁc functional categories T(ense) and C(omplementizer) in ways that
must be left aside for the moment12. Third, the ordering of lambda-operators in AS, i.e. the hi-
erarchy of syntactic argument positions, is – at least by default – a direct consequence of the
position the pertinent variable occupies in SF: earlier, that is lower ranking, argument positions
are bound to more deeply embedded variables in SF. For details see e.g. Bierwisch (1997). Fi-
nally, given entries like (22) and (23), the well-known relatedness between the adjective and the
two verbs open, and more generally the relation between adjectives and corresponding causative
and inchoative verbs can be captured in at least two ways. One is to collapse the related entries,
using their similarities to reduce the lexical information. I will illustrate this option in two steps.
The ﬁrst step is to integrate the inchoative and the causative verb into one entry that represents
two options, depending on the choice of the parts enclosed in heavy parentheses:
(24) /open/ [ +V, -N ] λx (βλy) λe [e: [(β[ACT y] [CAUSE) [BECOME [OPEN x]]]]]
Thesubscriptsoftheparentheses indicatethat theenclosed partsare eitherbothpresent orabsent.
The second step uses the sameconventionsto integrate(24) with the simpleadjective(22), which
comes out as the residue if the content of (α ...) is deleted13:
(25) /open/ [+V, -αN] λx (α (βλy) λe [e: [(β[ACT y] [CAUSE)[BECOME) [ OPEN x]]]]]
The alternative way to capture the relationship between (22) and (23) is to stick to the simple
lexical entry (22) for the adjective, generating the pertinent inchoative and causative verbs by
two more general templates (26)(a) and (b), which yield (23)(a) and (b), respectively, if applied
to (22), such that the variable “P” is substituted by OPEN:
(26) a. / Ø / [+V, -N] λP λx λe [e: [BECOME [P x]]]
b. / Ø / [+V, -N] λP λx λy λe [e: [[ACT y] [CAUSE [BECOME [P x]]]]]
We will notice below that (26)(a) is a phonologically empty variant of the inchoative copula be-
come, and (26)(b) is a kind of empty variant of make or cause to be. One of the problems created
12 Different, but converging proposals by Higginbotham (1985), Bierwisch and Lang (1989), Kamp and
Reyle (1983), Kratzer (1994), Wunderlich (1997), Kamp (2000), to mention just a few, have integrated the
verbal event reference with various aspects of argument structure, tense, adverbial modiﬁcation.
13 In (25), the subscript α of the parentheses is construed as a variable over + and –, where “+” indicates
the presence and “–” the absence of the content. These values are then also used to relate the content of SF
and AS to the features in Cat, such that +N shows up, if α is –, hence the content of the parentheses empty,
and –N otherwise. These notational devices have been proposed in Chomsky and Halle (1968), in order
to express generalizations in phonological rules. It has since been argued that this use of value-variables
allows all sorts of spurious or even absurd generalizations, such that it has been discarded in phonology.
Similar objections seem to hold with respect to lexical information. Hence the proposal formulated in (25)
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by (26) depends on the lexical constraints, idiosyncratically delimiting the set of adjectives to
which these templates apply: while both (26)(a) and (b) apply e.g. to open, dry, clear, near, nar-
row, only causativization by (26b) holds for clean or wet, and neither applies to long, short, red
and many other adjectives.14 It might be added, by the way, that (26)(b) is very similar to a tem-
plate that incorporates adjectivesnot into causativeverbs, but rather into resultativeconstructions
like he pushed the door open, where the matrix verb speciﬁes the activity indicated by ACT in
(26)(b).15
With this sketch of lexical information in mind, I will now turn to the question how the repre-
sentation of presuppositions will enter the picture. The general orientation I will follow in this
respect is givenby theproposalsdevelopedin Kamp (2001). According to these proposals,which
I will adopt as far as lexical information is concerned, the semantic representation of a linguistic
expression consists of at least two parts, the descriptive part D and the presupposition P , for
which I will use the following notation:
(27) [{ P } D ] where D consists of the Semantic Form SF as discussed so far, and
P a (possibly empty) set of conditions based on the same elements as SF.
We will have to add further comments, as we proceed.16 The two parts of the lexical entries are
then subject to compositional integration into the representation of complex expressions. For D
the compositional integration is essentially a consequence of saturating the positions in AS by
way of functional application (followed by lambda conversion) in one of two ways: If it is the
AS of a syntactic head, its positions are saturated by the appropriate complements; if it is the AS
of a modiﬁer or adjunct, its designated Argument position is uniﬁed with a position in the AS of
the head it modiﬁes. As to the presupposition P, the conditions it contains are integrated into the
presuppositional part P0 of the constituent it enters by syntactic composition. This integration
14 Causative formation as characterized by (26)(b) does in fact apply to long, short or strong, but not
by means of phonetically vacuous templates: lengthen, shorten, strengthen introduce the sufﬁx –en, in
addition to previous nominalization in the case of long and strong. Proposals concerning the intricate
interaction of derivational sufﬁxes and the lexical items they select are discussed in Bierwisch (1990).
15 More technically, the resultative template proposed by Wunderlich (2000) would look as follows:
(i) / Ø / [ +V, -N ] λP λx λV λy λe [e: [[V y e0] [CAUSE [BECOME [P x]]]]]
Without going into the details of distinguishing strong and weak resultative constructions discussed in
Wunderlich (2000), I will merely point out that BECOME enters this construction with all relevant conse-
quences in rather similar ways as it shows up in causatives derived by word formation.
16 In Kamp (2001) and related work, the descriptive part as well as the conditions in the presupposition
are represented in DRS-format. Although the conversion between the SF- and DRS-format is in practi-
cally all respects straightforward, I will stick here to the SF-representation as summarized in Bierwisch
(1997) for two interrelated reasons: First, while a DRS is constituted by an essentially unstructured set of
propositions, SF combines constants and variables according to their types into an integrated hierarchy.
For reasons discussed in Bierwisch (1997), this hierarchy corresponds to a strictly binary branching struc-
ture. Second, the hierarchy of positions in the Argument Structure AS, which relates variables in SF to
syntactic constituents specifying their value, depends crucially on just the SF-structure in question. There
is no problem to impose this type of structure on the set of propositions of a DRS, but then we arrive at
the SF organization adopted here.12 Presuppositions and Discourse
involves either local justiﬁcation, if a condition in P is met by the compositionally derived SF,
or it is uniﬁed with the conditions coming from its sister constituents.17
Let me illustrate the consequences of (27) by a simple example. The inchoative verb melt, for
which we might assume, in analogy to the entry (23)(a) for open, an entry like (28) as a ﬁrst
approximation, is a somewhat special case in several respects.
(28) /melt/ [ +V, -N ] λx λe [e: [BECOME [LIQUID x]]]
First, the change of state denoted by melt may (and usually does) involve a fairly extended pe-
riod between the presupposed and the target state. Moreover, this intermediate period is not just
undeﬁned with respect to its properties, as in e.g. die, open, or disappear. It rather is a clear state
of liquidity of part of the melting object. Nevertheless, melt is clearly a change of state, as borne
out by (29):
(29) My ice cream melted { (within) in a few minutes / ?for half an hour }
It is not essential for the moment whether melt should therefore be classiﬁed as an achievement
or an accomplishment in the standard sense. Second, and that is the crucial point at the moment,
melt does not simply denote the transition from non-liquid to liquid, as required from a standard
inchoative verb, but more speciﬁcally from solid to liquid. Let us suppose that this more speciﬁc
condition is to be represented as in (30), giving rise to the lexical presupposition as indicated:
(30) /melt/ [ +V, -N ] λx λe [ { s : [SOLID x]
| {z }
} [e : [BECOME [LIQUIDx]]]
| {z }
]
P D
In other words, the event e of x’s becoming liquid presupposes a state s of x’s being solid. Notice
that “x” is bound by the argument position “λx” in both the presupposition and the descriptive
part. This is clearly not sufﬁcient, though. In order to specify the relevant presuppositionthe state
s must meet the condition discussed in (7) above, i.e. it must overlap the event e (and precede the
target state s0). Suppose we consider the temporal relation of e and s0 as part of the conditions
associated with the constant BECOME that might be expressed as in (31):
(31) (e: [BECOME p ] is true at t) implies (s0: [p] is true at some t0 with t0 ￿ t , t0 ￿ t00 , t
￿ t00 ).
In other words, the target state s0 overlaps with e, but also with some t00 after e, hence s0 must
include the ﬁnal part of e. (31) at the same time guarantees that the truth of the target state p is
implied by the change. With this general condition on BECOME in mind, we might complete the
entry for melt as in (32), where, ‘s ￿ e’ is short for ‘T(s) ￿ T(e)’:
17 This is an extremely provisional description of what happens to D and P in the construction of complex
expressions. Some of the additional requirements to be observed will be ﬁlled in as we proceed. For a
slightly more detailed exposition of the saturation of positions in AS see Bierwisch (1997) and references
given there. A by far more scrutinized account of the compositional construction of presuppositions is
developed in Kamp (2001), where also additional distinctions within P are made, to which I have to
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(32) /melt/ [+V, -N] λx λe [ {s ￿ e & s: [SOLID x]} [e: [BECOME [LIQUID x]]]]
As the state characterized by [LIQUID x] overlaps with the end of e, [SOLID x] can only precede
it, if it is still to overlap e. Notice that both e and x in the presuppositional part are bound by the
respective argument positions. Hence whatever happens to these variables in SF will also apply
to their occurrence in the presuppositionalpart. There are two further problems to be noted. First,
the properties identiﬁed by SOLID and LIQUID must be construed as relying on what might be
called common sense physics, specifying general knowledge about aggregate states of familiar
substances, including the possible transitions. Hence the fact that heat is involved in liquefying
solid substances might be considered as supplied by encyclopedic knowledge activated by the
transition in question. Otherwise, an additional condition which speciﬁes the increase of tem-
perature of x must be added to the target state. Second, as it stands, the transition from solid to
liquid applies to the object x as a whole – contrary to fact, as already noted. It might in fact be
part of the common sense knowledge just mentioned that a change of aggregate state applies to
the substance, rather than shape or function of objects, turning them automatically into mass ob-
jects, such that the change gets partitioned according to the continuous or mass character of the
object relative to the change of aggregate state18. Instead of adding further complications to (32),
the main purpose of which was simply to illustrate the representation of lexical presuppositions,
I will leave it at that, returning to the issue under a different perspective below.
One ﬁnal point is to be made here. The presupposition in (32) introduces the variable “s”, which
does not occur in SF, but it does not constitute a discourse referent to be taken up elsewhere.
Therefore no particular care must be taken of this implicit variable. The more general case, how-
ever, needs the representation and binding of discourse referents. Kamp (2001) elaborates the
standard assumptions about discourse referents in important ways, providing in particular an ad-
ditional component BC of Binding Conditions providing the different options and restrictions
according to which the referential variables of nominal and verbal constituents exert their refer-
ential capacity. I will try to avoid these complexities as far as possible, focusing on the problem
of computing lexical presuppositions.
5 Computing the Presupposition of BECOME
As already noted, melt differs from inchoative verbs in general, as its presupposed state is more
speciﬁc than just the negation of the target state. In the general case, however, the presupposed
source state is fully predictable. The overall strategy of restricting lexical entries to the idiosyn-
cratic information would therefore require the computation of the predictable presuppositions by
18 There are at least twooptions to be considered here, if the issue is not shifted from semantics to extralin-
guistic common sense knowledge. One is to represent the ‘grinding’ of the object and the correspondingly
emerging sub-events explicitly in the lexical information, such that (32) would have to be replaced by
something like (i):
(i) /melt/ λx λe [{∀xi ∃ei [xi⊆x & ei⊆e & si ￿ ei & si: [SOLID xi]]} [ei: [BECOME [LIOQUID xi] ]]]
The other option would be to rely on a general template that as a kind of “universal grinder” accounts for
the fact that in (ii) the ice cube is treated as a substance rather than a cube by turning (32) into something
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general principles or at least language speciﬁc templates that apply across the board.
Given the discussion of (32) and the general observations about BECOME, it is obvious what for
an inchoative verb like open the result of this computation should look like: The entry (23)(a) –
repeated here as (33)(a) – must be expanded into (33b):
(33) a. /open/ [+V, -N] λx λe [e: [BECOME [OPEN x]]]
b. /open/ [+V, -N] λx λe [{s ￿ e & s: ¬[OPEN x]} [e: [BECOME [OPEN x]]]]
It is just a notational task to formulate an operation that would have this effect:
(34) [e: [BECOME [p]]] ⇒ [{s ￿ e & s: ¬[p]} [e: [BECOME [p]]]]
Instead of postulating an operation that expands the left into the right hand side of (34), which
would then require to somehow block iteration, it seems more appropriate to consider (34) as a
constraint on well-formed lexicalentries, which suppliesthepresuppositionif an entry that meets
the left hand side enters the derivation of an actual expression. Taken together, this constraint and
the condition (31) would then provide the full interpretation of BECOME.
With this proviso, standard inchoative verbs like open, die, disappear etc. can be lexically repre-
sented in the simple form without presupposition, as in (33)(a) or (35):
(35) /disappear/ [+V, -N] (λy) λx λe [e: [BECOME [¬ [ [PRESENT AT y]x]]]]
Two remarks are to be added here. First, the target state is characterized by a negated condi-
tion. Hence the constraint (34) will supply – as its negation – a positive condition. Second, the
condition of the target state speciﬁes the absence of the theme x from some location y, which
may be left completely implicit, however. This possibility is indicated by the optional argument
position binding the variable in question. If the location is made explicit, though, it appears as
a directional PP, as in (36). This is provisionally indicated by associating the optional position
“λy” with the morpho-syntactic feature [+Dir].19
(36) a. The target will disappear (from the screen).
b. The snow disappeared (from most places).
Obviously, the assumptions discussed so far must hold also with respect to what might be called
theinchoativecopula,i.e.theverbthatmerelyaddsthechange-of-stateoperatortothepredicative
of the copula. Examples like (37) illustrate the point:
19 This is only a provisional hint. The actual problem to be faced here both syntactically and semantically
are rather complex and must be left aside here. Notice however, that the value of “y”, whether explicitly
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(37) a. His brother was famous.
The book will be a scandal.
She is an excellent teacher.
Mary was sick.
They were there in time.
b. His brother became famous.
The book will become a scandal.
She becomes an excellent teacher.
Mary got sick.
They got there in time.
There are nontrivial conditions distinguishing the use of become and get, which I must ignore
here, treating become as the canonical case, which essentially provides BECOME with the acces-
sories of a fully ﬂedged lexical entry:20
(38) /become/ [+V, -N] λP λx λe [e: [BECOME [P x]]]
[+N]
The feature [+N] associated with the argument position “λP” is a provisional way to indicate
the selectional conditions for the predicative that combines with become. I assume here, that λP
must be saturated by a nominal constituent, i.e. an adjective as in become pregnant, or a noun as
in become president. For the sake of illustration, suppose that (39) is a simpliﬁed entry for the
adjective famous, which (38), completed according to the constraint (34), combines with to form
the VP become famous, represented in (40):21
(39) /famous/ [ +N, +V ] λz [FAMOUS z ]
(40) /become famous/ [ +V, -N ]
λx λe [{ s ￿ e ∧ s: ¬ [ FAMOUS x ]} [e: [BECOME [ FAMOUS x ]]]]
I want next like to show how these assumptions can account for what might be considered as the
dual counterpart of become, preferably realized by theverb remain. The correspondence between
the inchoativecopula and its counterpart may be illustrated by (41)(a) and (b), which have almost
identical meanings, provided ill is construed as equivalent to not healthy:22
20 This is not the place to deal with the remarkable complexity of the various readings of get, only one
of which is a close relative of become. I would nevertheless like to hint at the obvious similarity that the
relation between causative and inchoative get shares with that between transitive and intransitive open,
melt, dry, etc. In other words, the relation between constructions like (i) and (ii) should be treated parallel
to the two verbs open represented in (24). Hence, either by means of the Causative template or as a
complex lexical entry, we would have two readings of get as indicated in (iii):
(i) He got things right (~ He opened the shop)
(ii) Things got right (~ The shop opened)
(iii) /get/ [ +V, -N ] λP λx (βλy) λe [e: [(β[ACT y] [CAUSE)[BECOME [ P x]]]]]
For discussion of related properties of get see Haegeman (1985).
21 More explicitly, (40) derives in three steps. Supplying ﬁrst (38) with the presupposition by means of
(34) gives (i), which then combines with (39), yielding (ii), where by lambda conversion “λP” is deleted
and “P” replaced by “λz [ FAMOUS z ]”. Finally, lambda conversion turns (ii) into (40):
(i) λP λx λe [{s ￿ e & s: ¬[P x ]} [e: [BECOME [P x]]]]
(ii) λx λe [{s ￿ e & s: ¬ [ λz [FAMOUS z] x]} [e: [BECOME [ λz [FAMOUS z] x]]]]
22 The correspondence between become and remain is less clear-cut than e.g. the relation between werden16 Presuppositions and Discourse
(41) a. The kids remained ill.
b. The kids didn’t become healthy.
c. The kids were ill.
Notice ﬁrst, that if (41)(a) is true, the simple copula clause (41)(c) must also be true, while the
reverse does not hold: The truth of (41)(c) does not imply (41)(a), which asserts the continuation
of the state in question. In this respect, the state expressed by the copula clause behaves like
the target state of an inchoative construction. The next point to be noted is that (41)(a) does not
simply assert the continuation of sickness, as would e.g. The kids were still sick, it more specif-
ically denies the change leading from the source to a different target state. This is what makes
it equivalent to (41)(b), where the denial of the change to the complement state is expressed
explicitly.23 Finally, both (41)(a) and (b) share the same presupposition expressed by the copula
clause (41)(c), provided the relevant temporal ordering is assumed. More generally, remain pre-
supposes the predicated state p, and it denies the transition to ¬p. This comes out automatically,
if we set up the lexical entry (42), whose SF differs from that of become just by the negation of
the transition:
(42) / remain / [ +V, -N ] λP λx λe [ e :¬ [ BECOME ¬ [ P x ] ] ]
A couple of remarks are to be added here. First, (42) is incomplete in several respects. It doesn’t
take care e.g. of cases like nothing of the book remained, where P is syntactically empty, but
must semantically be interpreted as a kind of existential predication. This in turn has to do with
the status of the argument position λP and the morpho-syntactic constraints to be associated
with it. They are similar, but obviously not identical to those associated with the corresponding
position of become. I will leave aside these issues for the time being, turning to a second remark:
We clearly must expect the constraint (34) to apply in order to get (43), specifying the required
presupposition, viz. the negation of the target state:
(43) /remain/ [+V, -N] λP λx λe [{s ￿ e & s: [P x]} [e: ¬[BECOME ¬[P x]]]]
In order to derive (43) from (42) by means of (34), we must however, deal with the fact that
BECOME is in the scope of negation in (42), but not in (34) – or in the entry (38) for become, for
that matter. Intuitively, one would like to claim that (34), as it takes care of the presupposition
to be triggered, by the very nature of presuppositions holds for both the positive and the neg-
ative condition the presupposition is associated with. Hence (34) would apply to [BECOME p],
irrespective of the negation that preﬁxed in (42). Although this claim seems to me right in spirit,
it is insufﬁcient for two reasons. First, the consideration just mentioned applies to the external
and bleiben in German, which lacks competitors like get and keep. The main points, however, seem to be
as clear as they are in German and can reasonably be discussed with respect to remain as the paradigm
case.
23 It might be noted that literally speaking the negation of the change implies the negation of the target
state only as a consequence of the presupposed source state whose change is denied. Hence if the presup-
position is rejected – as in The kids didn’t become healthy, they simply were not sick at all – the result of
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negation, but not to the negation within the scope of BECOME, which clearly must be respected,
because otherwise we would derive the wrong presupposition. Hence the fact that the external
(but not the internal) negation is to be ignored must somehow be indicated in (34). Second, this
requirement seems to be part of a more general issue to be taken up with respect to causative
verbs. Finally, it is the occurrence of the negation “inside” and “outside” of BECOME in (42), that
makes remain the dual counterpart of become.24
As a consequence of this, the presupposed state, being the negation of a negative state, comes
out as a positive condition.
For the sake of illustration, (44) represents the verb phrase remain ill, assuming that the SF of
ill may be abbreviated as [ ¬ [ HEALTHY x ] ], which leaves the target state [ HEALTHY x ] by
canceling the double negation out.
(44) / remain ill / [ +V, -N ]
λx λe [ { s ￿ e & s: [ ¬ [ HEALTHY x ] ] } [ e :¬ [ BECOME [ HEALTHY x ] ] ] ]
It is easy to ﬁgure out that on the basis of these assumptions the SF of not become healthy must
come out practically identical to that in (44). In much the same way, the equivalence between
predications with remain and negated inchoatives as illustrated in (45) and (46) can be accounted
for:
(45) a. The shop remains closed.
b. He remained in Paris for weeks.
c. The dog remained alive.
(46) a. The shop doesn’t open.
b. He didn’t leave Paris for weeks.
c. The dog didn’t die.
Examples like these bring up an intriguing problem, once we switch the negation:
24 We might deal with this duality as a relation between constants of SF rather than lexical entries, by
setting up a postulate like (i), which then would naturally lead us to replace (42) by the entry (ii):
(i) REMAIN p ↔ ¬ [BECOME ¬ [p]]
(ii) /remain/ [+V, -N] λP λx λe [e: [REMAIN [P x]]]
I will not adopt here this alternative analysis for two reasons. First, we need the postulate (i) only to
introduce anadditional primitive element ofSF,allthe properties ofwhich arecaptured bythe combination
¬ BECOME ¬. Furthermore, we would not only have to set up (iii) – in addition to (34) – to account for the
presupposition induced by REMAIN, we would also need (iv) to account for its implication, as discussed
before, as (34) and (31) would not apply to REMAIN:
(iii) [e: [ REMAIN [ p ] ] ⇒ [{s ￿ e & s: [p] } [e: [REMAIN [p] ] ] ]]
(iv) (e: [REMAIN p] is true at t ) implies (s0: [p] is true at some t0 with t0 ￿ t, t0 ￿ t00, t0
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(47) a. The shop doesn’t remain closed tonight.
b. The shop opens tonight.
c. The shop is open tonight.
(48) a. The kids didn’t remain ill.
b. The kids became healthy.
c. The kids weren’t ill.
Most of the comments apply as before. Consider e.g. (48), which corresponds to (41), except
that positive and negative predications are exchanged, preserving the presupposition – the kids
being ill –, but target states exchanged, as expected. The problem to be noted concerns the state-
and event-properties: While negated events like (41)(b) behave in crucial respects like a state, as
shown in (49), a negated non-event, if that is what remain expresses, does not become an event,
as (50) indicates.25
(49) a. The kids didn’t become healthy for two months.
b. The shop doesn’t open for two hours.
(50) a. #The kids didn’t remain ill in two months.
b. #The shop doesn’t remain closed in two hours.
Clearly, (50) cannot mean that the kids became healthy in two months, or that the shop opens in
two hours. What this means is that the clausal negation and the negation within the SF of remain
do not cancel out each other in cases like (50). A preliminary consequence to be drawn from this
observation is to distinguish between (a) [ ¬ [e: p]] and (b) [e: ¬ [p]], where (a) could result from
clausal negation, while (b) is a lexical property. Although there are further problems to be taken
into consideration, I will assume for the time being that the entry for remain is at least on the
right track in this respect.
A ﬁnal comment is to be made with respect to causative verbs like those in (51), which share the
presupposed state of their inchoative counterparts in (52), indicated in (53):
25 Things are fairly complicated here, because judgments may rely on the possibility mentioned above,
to let durational adverbials qualify the target state, as in he came in for a few minutes, such that the
acceptability sentences like (49) can be construed as qualifying either the negated event or the negated
result, which factually amounts to the same. Somewhat different interpretive options blur the judgment
with respect to temporal limitations, as in (i) and (ii), which might be construed in analogy to construction
like with this medicine, he slept in a few minutes , where slept is interpreted as fell asleep:
(i) (?)The kids didn’t become healthy in two month.
(ii) (?)The shop doesn’t open in two hours.
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(51) a. Fred opened the shop the next day.
b. The sun dried the sheets quickly.
c. The book made the author famous.
d. The police killed the ferocious dog.
(52) a. The shop opened the next day.
b. The sheets dried quickly.
c. The author became famous.
d. The ferocious dog died.
(53) a. The shop was not open.
b. The sheets were wet.
c. The author was not famous.
d. The ferocious dog was alive.
Before turning to the computation of presuppositions for causative verbs, two side-issues might
bementioned,which need not concern ushere. First, causativeverbs (and causativeconstructions
in general) mostly, but not necessarily involve inchoativity, which is the source of the presuppo-
sition we are looking at. But causation may be responsible for states, rather than events. (54)
illustrates causation without inchoativity:
(54) a. The new engine turns the wheel very steadily.
b. The ﬁre brigade held the rope tight.
Here, no change of state is asserted or negated, hence no presupposed state is to be computed.
Second, causatives may introduce further presuppositions, due to the required type of agent or
the sort of causation. (55) illustrates some possibilities:
(55) a. They strangled the night-watchman.
b. Two hooligans stabbed the foreigner.
Whatever presuppositions strangle, stab and other verbs might add to the conditions of killing –
they need not concern us here, except that we must make sure that they do not interfere with the
construction of the presupposition induced by BECOME, to which I will turn now.
The basic schema of causative verbs has already been sketched with respect to the ambiguity of
open in (23)(b) above, which I repeat here for the sake of discussion:
(23) b. / open / [+V, -N] λx λy λe [e: [[ACT y] [CAUSE [BECOME [OPEN x]]]]]20 Presuppositions and Discourse
What we need to provide is the presupposition triggered by the inchoative open incorporated in
(23)(b). This should,ofcourse, in principlebe accomplishedby the constraint(34). To this effect,
two problems must be clariﬁed, however.
Theﬁrst oftheseproblemswasalready mentionedwithrespect tonegationshowingupinremain.
The generalization hinted at in that connection must deal with the fact that the presupposition
of BECOME is to be computed locally, i.e. without regard of the operators taking BECOME as
argument. The elements to be ignored would then include not only the negation, as discussed
earlier, but also the causative operator – or more correctly CAUSE and the speciﬁcation of the
causing event. To this effect, (34) would have to be modiﬁed as shown in (34’), indicating that
BECOME triggers its presupposition, also if it is subordinate to other operators:
(34’) [e: [...[BECOME [p]]]] ⇒ [{s ￿ e & s: ¬ [p]} [e: [...[BECOME [p]]]]]
The locality intended by this formulation is subject to crucial conditions governing the computa-
tion of the presuppositional component P for arbitrary complex expressions26. These conditions
must, among others, guarantee theclause headed by a givenverb as the domaingathering the per-
tinent presuppositions. Thus the embedded clause (John) to have opened the window in (56)(a)
and (b) must have the presupposition the window was closed, although this becomes a presup-
position of the matrix clause only within the scope of the factive verb regret, but not of the
non-factive verb believe:
(56) a. Johni believed [ei to have opened the window]
b. Johni regretted [ei to have opened the window]
This would fall out naturally, if we assume that presuppositions are uniﬁed with respect to the
event variable, which deﬁnes in a way the boundary of the domain in (34’).
This gets us to the second, more intricate problem. Notice that the relation between causative and
inchoative verbs explicitly exploited in notational variant (24) shifts the event reference repre-
sented by “e” from the change of state to the causation of the change. This is intuitively correct,
as far as the verb’s event reference is concerned, but it requires clariﬁcation of the temporal rela-
tion between the causation and the caused change, since the presupposition must be temporally
located in this respect. As discussed above, the time structure of a change of state is not a trivial
issue, the change being deﬁned only by the intervals it overlaps. An even more intricate problem
is the temporal location of the event represented as e: [p CAUSE q] with respect to the time of p
and q. Consider, forexample,a simplecase likeFredopened thedoor.In thesimplestcase, Fred’s
activity and the position of the door have the same location in time. But suppose Fred opens the
door pushing a button that releases the door, for reasons of security, with a delay of three min-
26 There is a large literature on the so-called projection problem of presuppositions dealing with these
conditions. A ﬁrst systematic integration of the conditions in question has been proposed in Karttunen and
Peters (1979). The problem is taken up in Kamp (2001) from a somewhat different perspective, which I
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utes. Then the time of p precedes that of q, without even a temporal overlap between p and q.27
There are two strategies to deal with these problems in view of (34’). The ﬁrst option is to rely
on the fact that conﬁgurations of the type [p [CAUSE [BECOME q ]]] are always to be construed as
direct causation, not allowing for any explicitly indicated intermediate events. With this proviso,
the source state of the change [BECOME q ] will just as well be a presupposition for the change
in question as for its causation. With this construal, (34’) would account for the presupposition
of both the inchoative and the causative verbs. The second option takes into account the different
events e and e0, instantiating [p [CAUSE q]], and q, respectively, with a corresponding reformu-
lation of (43’). As this reformulation would be reasonable only if it takes into account further
considerations, which go beyond the scope of the present concern, I will adopt the ﬁrst option,
assuming that (34’) so far correctly computes the presupposition associated with BECOME.
Theseconsiderationscarry overto therelativelysmallgroup ofverbs wherecausativitycombines
with the negation of inchoativity. A case in point is keep in one of its readings, as exempliﬁed in
(57):
(57) a. Max kept the kids running.
b. Mary didn’t keep these things in good shape.
The presupposition in (a) is that the kids were running, so that Max caused them to continue,
while (b) presupposes, that things were in good shape and denies that Mary caused the continu-
ation of this state. (58) is an entry from which these conditions would follow:28
(58) /keep/ [+V, -N] λP λx λy λe [e: [[ACT y] [CAUSE ¬ [BECOME ¬ [P x]]]]]
[X]
The morpho-syntactic condition indicated by [X] has to specify the properties characterizing the
different predicatives keep allows for. Thus in keep them running “P” is replaced by the SF of
them running, which eventually gives (59):
(59) /keep them running/ [+V, -N]
λyλe [x | {s ￿ e ∧ s : [RUNx]} [e: [[ACT y] [CAUSE ¬ [BECOME ¬ [P x]]]]]]
27 The problem has been discussed, among others, in Dowty (1979), where three possibilities are consid-
ered: the time of e: [ p CAUSE q ] coincides with (a) the time of q, (b) the time of p, and (c) the smallest
interval that overlaps with the time of p and the time of q. Dowty considers (c) as the most plausible
solution in most cases.
28 The various other readings of keep are, of course, not unrelated to the one considered here. They are
thus subject to similar considerations like the entries for open, get, etc. discussed earlier. Thus the relation
between (57)(a) and the intransitive counterpart The kids kept running could be captured by a complex
entry like (i), using the notational devices mentioned above:
(i) /keep/ [+V, -N] λP λx (αλy) λe [e: [(α[ACT y] [CAUSE ) ¬ [BECOME ¬ [P x]]]]]
[Y]
I will not go into those issues, being concerned here primarily with the computation of presuppositions.22 Presuppositions and Discourse
The underlined variable “x” is a provisional indication of the discourse referent introduced by
the pronoun they (or them, for that matter), which binds the argument x of RUN:29
6 BECOME, Events, and Processes
In this section, I will take up the subtle, but intricate difference illustrated in (60) and (61), in
order to show how it can be accommodated by the analysis of BECOME proposed so far.
(60) a. The heap became six feet high {within two days/#for quite a while}.
b. The heap became higher than six feet {within two days/#for quite a while}.
c. The heap became higher (and higher) {#within two days/for quite a while}.
(61) a. Hans wurde {in kurzer Zeit/#eine Weile lang} so groß wie Paul.
({In a short time/#for quite a while}, Hans became taller than Paul.)
b. Hans wurde {in kurzer Zeit/#eine Weile lang} größer als Paul.
({In a short time/#for quite a while}, Hans became taller than Paul.)
c. Hans wurde {#in kurzer Zeit/eine Weile lang} (immer) größer.
({#In a short time/for quite a while} Hans became taller (and taller).)
What is at issue is the fact that the (a)- and (b)-sentences express changes with a well deﬁned
target state in the sense discussed so far, whereas the (c)-sentences describe processes not ter-
minating in a ﬁnal result state, as borne out by the mutually exclusive temporal adverbials they
naturally combine with. Correspondingly, the (a)- and (b)-sentences make the usual presupposi-
tion – the heap was not six feet high and not higher than six feet in (60)(a) and (b), respectively,
Hans was not as tall as and not taller than his brother in (61)(a) and (b), respectively – while it
seems to be fairly unclear what happens to the presupposition in the (c) sentences. I will try to
clarify these problems in three steps.
First, as the issue clearly has to do with the semantics of comparatives, I will begin with a sketch
oftherelevantingredientsofpositiveand comparativeadjectives.Relying onproposalsdiscussed
in Bierwisch (1989), the elements minimally needed for an adjective like high and its antonym
low are indicated in (62), where VERT abbreviates a function that assigns an object x its vertical
extension (or position), i.e. its height, which is then related to the sum [v + d] or the difference [v
– d], indicating that the height exceeds or falls short of some value v by some difference d30:
29 The notational proposal to represent discourse referents as a component of SF,separated by |, is adopted
from Maienborn (2002).
30 The value of [VERT x] is not simply equal to [v + d], but must cover or even exceed it. This must be
assumed for a number of reasons, one being the fact that negating [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]] does not allow
[VERT x] to be greater than [v + d]. Hence [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]] means [VERT x] is not less than [v + d],
with [[VERT x] = [v + d]] as default interpretation. The same consideration holds for the converse relation
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(62) a. /high/ [+N, +V] (λd) λx [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]]
b. /low/ [+N, +V] (λd) λx [[VERT x] ≤ [v – d]]
The amount of d might be speciﬁed by a measure phrase, as in (60)(a), or it might be left implicit,
as in the heap was high. This is indicated by the optionality of the position “λd”. If d is left
implicit, the value of v must be something like the expected standard or normal case N, while the
speciﬁcation of d, e.g. by the value of six feet, requires d to be measured from the ground, such
that the value of v must be 0.31 In other words, v is a kind of parameter, the two values of which
are N and 0, chosen according to general principles of interpretation. With these assumptions,
we get the VP-representations in (64), if (63) abbreviates the entry for the copula be, discussed
a.o. in Bierwisch (1997), Maienborn (2002):
(63) /be/ [+V, -N] λP λx λs [s: [P x]]
(64) a. /be six feet high/ [+V, -N] λx λs [s: [[VERT x] ≥ [0 + 6 FEET]]
b. /become six feet high/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [{s ￿ e & s: ¬ [[VERT x ] ≥ [0 + 6 FEET ]]}
[e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [0 + 6 FEET]]]]]
It might be worth noticing that in (64)(b) the presupposition induced by BECOME is correctly
speciﬁed as just the negation of the target state: Eventually the heap became six feet high presup-
poses that the heap was six feet high was false before the change, without any speciﬁcation of
the heap’s height (or even existence) – except that it could not be six feet or more.
The second step is to supply the comparative, whose essence is to provide an explicit possibility
to specify the value of v as a standard of comparison, which is the six feet in (60)(b), and (the
height of) Paul in (61)(b). Putting aside the non-trivial matters involved in morphological rules
deriving higher than from high, the essential point can be expressed by the following entries for
comparative adjectives, which provide an additional argument position, making the variable v
available for syntactically speciﬁed values:
(65) a. /high+er/ [+N, +V] (λd) λv λx [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]]
b. /low+er/ [+N, +V] (λd) λv λx [[VERT x] ≤ [v – d]]
On the basis of these entries, VPs like (66) can be constructed, where the optional position “λd”
is omitted, hence d is unspeciﬁed, while v is replaced by the SF of six feet:
31 This explains, by the way, why *two feet low is anomalous: Since the negative adjective requires the
value of d to be subtracted from v, no height would result if v is 0. This does not hold, as we will see
immediately, for the well-formed two feet lower, since the comparative provides a value for v that is
necessarily different from 0. – It might be noted at this point that there is general agreement with respect
to the ingredients of this analysis, although they have been formulated in a number of different ways. For
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(66) a. /be higher than six feet/ [+V, -N] λx λs [s: [[VERT x] ≥ [6 FEET + d]]]
b. /be lower than six feet/ [+V, -N] λx λs [s: [[VERT x] ≤ [6 FEET – d]]]
Notice that in (66)(a) – differing from (64)(a) – 6 FEET is the value of v, rather than the dif-
ference variable d, which may be additionally speciﬁed, as shown in ten inches higher than six
feet or twelve inches lower than ten feet. With these independently motivated ingredients the
representation of the VP of (60)(b) seems to be straightforward:
(67) /become higher than six feet/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [ v | {s ￿ e & s: ¬ [[VERT x ] ≥ [v + d ]]} [e: [BECOME [[VERT x ] ≥ [ v + d ]]]]]
A remark is necessary here concerning the implicit variable “d”, which I have construed in (67)
as a kind of parameter, the value of which is automatically copied by the constraint (34’). This
seems to be correct in view of the fact that “d” can be explicitly speciﬁed in constructions like
become ten inches higher that six feet, where “d” has the value of ten inches. With this proviso,
(67) correctly speciﬁes the shift to x’s exceeding the height of six feet by d, presupposing that it
did not before the change. Even though this seems to be the appropriate treatment of d in cases
like (60)(b), we have to consider further aspects, as we proceed.
The third step has to provide an account of the process expressed by the (c)-sentences in (60) and
(61). One point to notice here is that constructions like these are ambiguous between the process
reading in question and an event-reading, which is possible only if the optional repetition higher
and higher in (60) and the optional adverbial immer (always) in (61) are omitted. This event
reading differs from the (b)-sentences by its lack of an explicitly speciﬁed value for v, relying
on some contextually given value to compare with. Under this interpretation, (60)(c) is in a way
elliptical, leaving the argument position “λv” unsaturated. The VP that accounts for this reading
of (60)(c) can best be represented as in (68), where “v” indicates a discourse referent in the sense
mentioned earlier. Thus “v” indicates a contextually speciﬁed discourse referent, which supplies
the lacking than-complement (say the height of the wall nearby), and it correspondingly binds
also the occurrence of “v” in the presupposition:
(68) /become higher/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [v | {s ￿ e & s: ¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]]} [e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]]]]]
It should furthermore be noted in passing that this reading is compatible with a measure phrase
specifying the value of “d”, as in the heap became ten inches higher (than the wall), which
suggests, that not only v, but also “d” be copied in the negated condition of the presupposition.
The crucial point now is the treatment of the process reading. This reading characteristically
excludes any explicit speciﬁcation of the values for either “v” or “d”, as (69) shows:
(69) a. The heap became (*two feet) higher and higher (*than the wall).
b. Hans wurde (*10 cm) immer größer (*als Paul).
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The actual impact of (69) is that the process reading does not only prevent explicitly speciﬁed
values for either “v” or “d”, it induces in fact a completely different regime over these variables.
The intuitive notion that suggests itself is that the process is to be construed as a continuous
sequence of changes each of which adds some amount d to the value v reached before. This
means with respect to “v”, that it must not refer to any discourse referent of its own, but merely
to a value deﬁned by the previous state of x. With respect to “d”, its value can only be determined
by the successive states of x and the value of [VERT x] along these states. In other words, the
process reading of become + Comparative takes an earlier state of x as deﬁning the value of “v”.
This allows neither “v” nor “d” to be speciﬁed by values external to the process of x’s continuous
changing. In order to make this notion more explicit, let vi be the value of [VERT x] at some time
ti, where ti precedes the time t0
i of the target state s0 of the event e under description. Suppose
furthermore that we represent by “di” the difference between the value of [VERT x] at ti and t0
i,
such that the value of [VERT x] reaches [vi + di] at t0
i. With this assumption we get (70)(a) as a
possible representation for the incremental steps constituting the process in question, with (34’)
computing the standard presupposition spelled out in (70)(b):
(70) a. /become higher/ [+V, -N] λx λe [e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]]]
b. /become higher/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [{s ￿ e & s: ¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]} [e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]]]]
The presupposition in (70)(b) requires [VERT x] to be below [vi + di] before the change instanti-
atedbyetakesplace.Thiscondition,althoughapparentlycorrect,leavesaproblemtobeclariﬁed,
because it is crucially less speciﬁc than the assumption already made, namely that [[VERT x] =
vi] holds at ti. Now the condition ¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]] (or its formal equivalent [[VERT x]
￿ [vi
+ di]]) converges with this condition to exactly the degree to which di approximates 0. In other
words, ti with the condition [[VERT x] = vi] becomes a more speciﬁc condition imposed on the
presupposed source state of e, if we take d = 0 in the presupposition. With this consideration in
mind, we may replace (70)(b) by the more restrictive (70)(c):
(70) c. /become higher/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [{s ￿ e & s: [[VERT x] = vi]} [e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]]]]
Notice that no speciﬁc condition on the time ti ﬁxing vi is needed: It simply precedes the ﬁnal
state of e, according to the conditions holding at both states. What should be observed, however,
is the speciﬁc regime that this option requires for the variables “vi” and “di”. We already noted
that they are not available for syntactically speciﬁed values, and they are not open to contextual
interpretation either although they are under strict, albeit implicit, control. The variable v in
expressions like (62), for which the comparative would create a special argument position, now
obviates any recourse to either syntactic or contextual speciﬁcation. The same holds for d in
(62), whose counterpart in (70) is moreover subject to its own speciﬁc conditions, indicated by
the value di. As di was introduced to represent the difference between the extent of [VERT x] at
ti and t0
i, its actual value is dependent on vi and t. As a matter of fact, the value of d under this
construal becomes a function of vi and t; it ceases to be an independent parameter, in case it is
not explicitly speciﬁed. In order to see to what extent these assumptions – and representations
like (70) that rely on them – provide an appropriate account of the process character of getting
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First, as already mentioned, become higher in the relevant reading of (60)(c) is supposed to ex-
press a continuouschange, while(70)seems torepresent asingleeventinstead ofahomogeneous
process. Second, as (60)(c) is neither elliptical nor open for explicit speciﬁcation, the origin of
vi that provides the value of comparison needs to be clariﬁed. These problems, which are not
independent of each other, shall be discussed in turn.
The basic intuition about states and processes has been made explicit e.g. in Bach (1986): Each
part of a process e must meet the same condition as e as a whole. Complying with this require-
ment, each part of x’s getting higher is itself an instance of x getting higher. This intuition can be
captured in two ways. The ﬁrst is to explicitly turn the eventuality e referred to in cases like (70)
into a (potentially inﬁnite) set of sub-eventualities all subject to the condition expressed in (70),
a proposal sketched a.o. in Bierwisch (2000). The necessary ‘grinding’ of e can be accomplished
by a template like (71), which distributes the condition P from an argument z to its (im)proper
parts, thus warranting the decisive property of processes (as well as mass terms):
(71) λP λz [∀zk [ zk ⊆ z ] [P zk] ]
A well known case in point is the mass interpretation of count nouns like chicken in examples
like There was chicken all over the plate.32 Applying this template to (70)(a), we derive (72)33:
(72) /become higher/ [+V, -N] λx λe [∀zk [zk ⊆ e] [zk: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]]]]
This leaves us with the task to relate the variable “vi” indicating the height at the previous stage
to the sub-event zk. Intuitively, one would like to say that vi is the value of [VERT x] resulting
from the previous sub-event zk−1. A moment’sreﬂection shows that this is already inherent in the
stipulationby which vi was introduced, according to which ti has to precede t0
i, and ti is moreover
the time of the source state of e, according to the reasoning underlying (70)(c). Hence without
further stipulation, we get (73) with the presupposition spelled out as discussed with respect to
(70)(c) where i < k and ti < tk for arbitrary i and k.
(73) /become higher/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [∀zk [zk ⊆ e] {sk ￿ zk & sk: [[VERT x] = vi]]} [zk: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]]]]
What (73) in fact expresses is that e consists of sub-events zk, each of which presupposes a state
where the height of x is vi and end in a state where it is vi + di, which then becomes the presup-
position of a possible subsequent event zk0. This turns e into an eventuality that meets exactly the
32 This is not quite correct as an account of the mass-interpretation available for nouns like chicken, lamb,
egg, etc. The mass noun property is rather a consequence of construing chicken by what has been called
conceptual shift in the sense of meat from chicken. This concept is then already subject to the condition
(71). What is to be noted here is merely, that (71) is not an ad-hoc stipulation.
33 Technically, (71) combines with (70)(a) by functional composition, with λP being saturated by the
predicate λe [e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]]]. Then lambda conversion yields (72), where “e” replaces
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conditions of a process34. The interesting point is that the presupposition automatically triggered
by BECOME takes care of the internal ordering among the sub-events collected in e35.
This consideration directly leads to the second possibility to account for of the homogeneity in
the process of getting higher (and higher). It consists in the proposal to simply take (70)(c) as
it stands, relying on the following consideration. The homogeneity that holds for mass terms,
states, and processes alike is usually not explicitly represented in the semantic representation,
but taken as an intrinsic characteristic that comes into play if the pertinent properties are at issue.
Hence entries like (74) rather than (75) are taken as canonical for the mass- and process-terms
water and sleep, respectively:
(74) a. /water/ [+N,-V] λz [WATER z ]
b. /sleep/ [-N,+V] λx λe [e: [SLEEP x]]
(75) a. /water/ [+N,-V] λz [∀zj [zj ⊆ z] [WATER z]]
b. /sleep / [-N,+V] λx λe [∀zj [zj ⊆ e] [zj: [SLEEP x]]
The conditions made explicit in (75) do in fact hold in (74): They are inherent conditions of
the predicates WATER and SLEEP, respectively.36 We might, in the same sense, suppose that the
process character of getting higher is a matter of the predicate applying to e in (70), where the
condition by which it differs from the (elliptical) event interpretation in (68) is just the variable
“vi” which is not bound by an (implicit) discourse referent, as the “v” in (68), but related to
a previous state of x, such that no event-external target state gets deﬁned. Viewed in this way,
the property deﬁned in (70) is inherently a process, just like the properties deﬁned by SLEEP or
MOVE are inherently processes. In other words, the event represented in (68) and the process
represented in (70) differ just as much as a lamb and lamb – or whisky and a whisky, for that
matter –, the difference formally represented by the discourse referent v in (68) and the unbound
parameter vi with the value of di depending on it in (70).
34 It has sometimes been objected, e.g. in Steinitz (1998), against this line of reasoning that processes like
getting higher are not sequences of events but rather continuous changes. In a similar vein, Steinitz argues,
Jackendoff (1996) rejects the view that motion can be characterized by a ﬁnite set of subevents. “A ﬁnite
sequence of subevents necessarily has as speciﬁed beginning and ending, so it cannot encode the absence
of endpoints.” (p.316). The misunderstanding comes from assuming a ﬁnite sequence of subevents. The
collection of subevents relied on in (71) is neither discrete nor ﬁnite, just like conceptually an amount of
water is neither a discrete nor a ﬁnite set of sub-quantities of water. What the condition in (71) expresses
is merely the requirement that whatever zk might be chosen, it has the same property as z and any other
part of it. This is exactly what Bach (1986) assumes for processes.
35 It might be noted that the optional adverbial immer in German and the optional repetition of the com-
parative higher and higher in English and German indicate somehow the iteration introduced by (71).
Although this looks plausible in principle and might be correct etymologically, it is not an effect of com-
positional interpretation and has to be left as a remark of plausibility.
36 There are in fact templates having the inverse effect of the “grinder” (71) deriving count nouns like two
beer or more than one whisky with different ways to support the individuation. Note also the comments in
footnote 32 on shifted count nouns.28 Presuppositions and Discourse
This gets us to the second problem to be clariﬁed with respect to (70), namely the source and the
status of the value vi as well as di, which need to be treated separately. As to vi, a straightforward
way to clarify the issue seems to be the assumption that the position “λv” of the comparative is
removed from the argument structure in entries like (65), leaving “v” as a parameter, for which
“vi” is just a notational variant to make its character explicit. By this assumption, (70) would
not be elliptical, as (68) indeed is, and it ceases to represent an event that ends with a distinct
target state. This sort of reasoning, however, runs into serious difﬁculties: Even though there
are different proposals as to how the comparative is to be represented, there is clear consensus
that relating to an entity to be compared with is the distinguished property of comparatives.
In terms of the analysis assumed here, it is the very position “λv” in (65) that represents this
property. Hence removing it from the entry of the comparative deprives the comparative from
its core characteristic. Moreover, the notational contrast between “vi” and “v” is not just a hint
to the reader but has systematic consequences, since “vi” is not available for the values 0 and
N, the options for “v” in the positive. Hence “vi” (or whatever notation one might choose) must
have a systematic status by its own. In short, then, “vi” must be different from “v”, presumably
related to the comparative morpheme in one way or the other, and it is not available for binding
by an argument position or an (implicit) discourse referent. For the time being, I will leave
it at that, brieﬂy returning to the problem below.37 I will assume, however, that eventually an
account should beavailablewhich reduces this problemto independentlymotivatedassumptions.
Although the status of di requires an account by its own, it is clearly not independent of vi, hence
I will not make an ad hoc proposal for this element either.
To sum up the considerationsabout the contrast illustrated in (60) and (61): If BECOME combines
with a comparative not providing a value of comparison, the result denotes a process rather than
an event. The reason is the lack of a proper target state: The property of x deﬁned by [[DIM x] ≥
[ vi + di ]] – where [ DIM x ] stands for any dimensional characteristic of x – is only ﬁxed with
respect to the change-internal value vi. In this sense, the parameter vi turns the event marked by
BECOME into a continuous process, where the presupposition provided by (34’) is restricted in a
way which guarantees the coherence between the parts of the process, providing each potential
stage with its presupposed predecessor. As a side-effect, the collection of values for “di” maps
the growths (or reduction) of [DIM x] onto parts of the time interval of e, whatever partitioning
of the process e is considered.
Additional motivation for this analysis comes from the fact that verbs like fall, rise, grow, in-
crease, reduce, change and quite a few others, denoting transition processes which Fabricius-
Hansen (2001) calls counterdirectional, can most naturally be construed as incorporating com-
parative constructions of the sort just discussed, as examples like (76) and their close synonyms
(77) show:
(76) a. The price of gas rises.
b. Later on, the interest rate fell.
c. His debts increased.
d. The tree grew, but only slowly.
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(77) a. The price of gas becomes higher.
b. Later on, the interest rate got lower.
c. His debts became larger.
d. The tree became taller, but only slowly.
Assumingthat fall and rise indicate movementson a vertical scale, the entry for rise can be given
as (78)38.
(78) /rise/ [+V, -N] λx λe [e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]]]
This entry triggers a presupposition in much the same way in which (70)(a) fosters the presup-
position spelled out in (70)(c). There is one non-trivial point to be added here, however. (78) is
intended to account for cases like (76)(a), which do not come with a speciﬁcation of the amount
of rising. But such a speciﬁcation is possible, as shown in (79):
(79) a. The price of gas rises at least ten cent.
b. The river has risen two feet.
Cases like these require two amendments. First, like dimensional adjectives and their compar-
atives – see (62) and (65), respectively – rise and fall admit an optional argument position, by
which the value of “d” can syntactically be speciﬁed by a Measure Phrase. This leads to the
following modiﬁcation of (78):
(80) /rise/ [+V, -N] (λd) λx λe [e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]]]]
Second, in order to accommodate a speciﬁcation of “d” made possible by (80), “v” must provide
a value this speciﬁcation can be added to (or subtracted from). This is – according to the assump-
tions made above – an automatic consequence of replacing “di,” which is completely dependent
on the occurrence of “vi”, by the variable “d”, which is bound by the argument position “λd”.
The value of “v” can only be 0 or some contextually speciﬁed amount to compare with. In cases
like (79), this must be due to some discourse referent v taken from the previous context. In other
words, it must not be a “process-internal” value “vi”, but rather an externally given target v. For
this reason, I have switched back in (80) to “v” instead of “vi”, supposing that “v”, if it is not
bound by some discourse referent v, allows for the value 0, N, or vi, depending on general con-
ditions of semantic interpretation.39 With this proviso, the VP of (79)(b) will be something like
(81):
38 It might be noted that I ignore here (and throughout) the alternation between vertical extension and
vertical position. As a matter of fact, high is ambiguous between extension and position in high window,
while high position is restricted to location, and high mountain to extension. In the same way, rise alter-
nates between position in the sun rises and extension in the river rises and is presumably ambiguous in
the ground rises. Hence VERT is underspeciﬁed in this respect, sensitive to conditions not to be explored
here.
39 Two points of the otherwise fairly complex conditions should be sorted out here. First, vi must now
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(81) /rise two feet/ [+V, -N] λx λe [v| e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [v + 2 FEET]]]]
One might observe, incidentally, that the presupposition “s:¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [v + 2 FEET]]”, which
(34’) triggers in (81), is implied by the narrower condition “s: [[VERT x] = v]”. Notice, moreover,
that rise as a lexical entry with the optional argument “λd” is parallel to its close synonym
become higher as discussed with respect to (60)(c), the two readings of which are made explicit
in (76) vs. (78). One consequence of an explicit value assigned to “d” is that e.g. rise two feet
is an event (or more speciﬁcally an accomplishment according to the Vendler-terminology), and
not a process, since only the ﬁnal part of the event satisﬁes the condition of rising two feet, much
like became two feet higher or became higher than six feet.40
To summarize these considerations: the occurrence of “vi” (or whatever represents the process
character of rise, become higher, etc.) is incompatible with the assignment of process-external
values to either “v” or “d”. In this sense, vi and di warrant the homogeneity of the continuous
change expressed by rise, fall, and their equivalents.
7 The Interaction of BECOME and AGAIN
A ﬁnal consideration will take up one of the issues repeatedly discussed with respect to BECOME
and illustrated by the ambiguity of cases like (82):
(82) At six the shop closed again.
Under the so-called restitutive reading, (82) presupposes that the shop was closed before the
event in question, under the repetitive reading, it presupposes a previous event of closing, hence
a second period of the shop’s being open. The restitutive reading is preferred, under nuclear
stress on close, while nuclear stress on again forces the repetitive reading. The standard analysis
relates this difference in one way or the other to the scope of the particle again.41 Thus adding
the particle again to a VP like close in (82) introduces the presupposition that either the event
as a whole (repetitive) or merely the state resulting from it (restitutive) occurred already before.
The semantics of again must therefore proliferate the semantic structure φ of the constituent it
combines with, adding the presupposition that φ or the result of φ occurred before. In order to
Second, for the value vi to show up, the variable “d” must not be assigned any speciﬁc value. In other
words, if “d” is speciﬁed by a measure phrase or any other complement, “v” cannot be construed as vi.
For discussion of the conditions governing the choice of 0 and N for “v”, see Bierwisch (1989).
40 Notice that the discourse referent v in (81) binds also the variable “v” in the presupposition generated
by BECOME, as shown in (i):
(i) /rise two feet/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [v | {s ￿ e & s: ¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [v + 2 FEET]]} [e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [V + 2 FEET]]]]]
41 For an overview of the various attempts to account for these phenomena see the references given in
footnote 7, and also Bierwisch (2000), and Fabricius-Hansen (2001). The following discussion will be
restricted to the semantic effect that again has on expressions with BECOME. I must refrain from dealing
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capture this alternation, I will deﬁne an operator RES that suppresses the transition, retaining
merely the eventual resulting state:
(83) s: [RES [ BECOME p ] ] =def [s: p ]
By means of this operator, we can express the two readings induced by again by the entry (84),
where the categorization [Part] is completely provisional, indicating that again is a particle ad-
joined to a [+V]-constituent of as its syntactic head:
(84) /again/ [Part] λP λx λe [ (∃ e0) {e0
￿ e & e0: (RES) [P x]} e: [P x]]
[+V]
The condition “e0
￿ e” indicates that the event e0 and hence its result precedes e. The optionality
of RES accounts for the two readings of again: If RES shows up, we get the restitutivecase, if it is
dropped, we get the repetitivereading.42 Applyingthe two variantsof this entry to the intransitive
verbclosein(85)–thestraightforwardantonymofopenin(33)withthe BECOME-presupposition
supplied – yields (86) for the restitutive and (87) for the repetitive reading, respectively. Let us
ﬁrst look at (86), where RES picks out the target state ¬ [ OPEN x ] and adds it to the presupposi-
tion component, ﬁxing it as preceding the event e. As the state s : [ OPEN x ] induced by BECOME
and s0 : ¬[ OPEN x ] induced by again cannot be simultaneous, the letter can only precede the
former:
(85) /close/ [+V, -N] λx λe [(∃ s0){ s ￿ e & s: [OPEN x]} e: [BECOME ¬ [OPEN x ]]]
(86) /close again/ [+V, -N] λx λe [{s0
￿ e & s ￿ e & s0: ¬ [OPEN x] & s: [OPEN x]]}
e : [ BECOME ¬ [ OPEN x ] ] ]
Turning to the repetitive reading, we notice that ﬁrst again adds the complete previous event
e0: [BECOME ¬ [OPEN x]] to the presupposition component, which then triggers its own presup-
position, indicating that e0 also starts with the condition s0: [OPEN x]:
(87) /close again/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [(∃ e0)(∃ s0){e0
￿ e & s0 ￿ e0 & s ￿ e & s0: [OPEN x] & e0: [BECOME ¬ [OPEN x]] &
s: [OPEN x]]}
e : [BECOME ¬ [OPEN x]]]
42 This optionality is not the correct solution, though, as the restitutive reading is restricted to again
without nuclear stress, which is again restricted syntactically. A ﬁrst step to account for these additional
conditions might be expressed as in (i), using the index-mechanism mentioned earlier:
(i) /again/ [Part, αFocus] λP λx λe [ (∃ e0) {e0
￿ e & e0: (b RES) [P x]} e: [P x]]
[+V]
Condition: α = plus implies b = minus
This is only a ﬁrst approximation for reasons mentioned in note 41. In particular, (i) does not spell out the
syntactic and prosodic properties connected to [+ Focus], regulating stress and surface position.32 Presuppositions and Discourse
Noticethat thecorrect sequence ofstates OPEN → ¬OPEN → OPEN → ¬OPEN with theﬁrst three
states belonging to the presupposition, while the last one marks the eventual result, automatically
derives from the entries for again and close plus the template (34’).
Let us ﬁnally turn to the intricate cases of BECOME that alternate between event and process.
For the sake of illustration, I will restrict the discussion to the cases in (88), where underscoring
indicates focus stress:
(88) a. The river rises slowly.
b. The river has risen two feet.
c. The river has risen two feet again.
d. The river has risen two feet again. / Again the river has risen two feet.
e. The river rises again.
f. The river rises again. / Again the river is rising.
To begin with, (88)(a) allows for an event- and a process-reading, as already discussed. For
the sake of reference, l repeat as (89) the entry given in (80), supplied with the presupposition
induced by BECOME, from which rise two feet derives as already shown in (81), where the
process reading is blocked by the speciﬁcation of d, which requires v to be contextuallyspeciﬁed,
as indicated by the discourse referent v:
(89) /rise/ [+V, -N]
(λd) λx λe [{s ￿ e & s: ¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]]} e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]]]]
(81) /rise two feet/ [+V, -N]
(λd) λx λe [ v {s ￿ e & s: ¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [v + 2FEET]]} e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [v + 2FEET]]]]
If this is combined with again, we get the two readings, as expected. Intuitively, the preferred
interpretation of (88)(c) indicates the restitution of an earlier sate, where the river had a height
that has now been reached again through rising by two feet. Formally, that comes out as (90), an
automatic consequence of combining again with (81):
(90) /rise two feet again/ [+V, -N ]
λx λe [v | (∃ s0) {s0
￿ e & s ￿ e & s: [[VERT x] ≥ [v + 2 FEET]] & s: ¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [v +
2 FEET]]} e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [v + 2 FEET]]]]
Notice that, much like for restitutive open again represented in (86), three states are identiﬁed:
the presupposed height of v+2, picked out by the result-operator RES of again, then less than
v+2, presupposed by BECOME, and ﬁnally the target v+2, all with respect to a contextually ﬁxed
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Looking next at the repetitive interpretation, which is the only possibility for (88)(d)43, where no
RES reduces the presupposition of again to the previous occurrence of the target state, we get
(91), with four successive state, as in (87) for close again, with necessarily two values v and v0
to be compared with.44
(91) /rise two feet again/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [v, v0 | (∃ e0) (∃ s0) {e0
￿ e & s0 ￿ e0 & s ￿ e & s0: ¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [v0 + 2 FEET]] &
e0: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [v0 + 2 FEET]]] & s : ¬ [[VERT x] ≥ [v + 2 FEET]]} e: [BECOME
[[VERT x] ≥ [v + 2 FEET]]]]
What (88)(d) expresses, does not necessarily mean that the two events add up to the rivers rising
by four feet. As a matter of fact, e and e0 are independent of each other, with falling or rising or
not changing water in between.
Let us ﬁnally turn to the processes in (88)(e) and (f), where once again (88)(f) unambiguously
denotes arepeated process, i.e. it asserts a process ofrising, and it presupposesa previousprocess
of the same type. Relying on the process reading of rise given in (78) with the presupposition
added, we get (92) as the effect of combining it with repetitive again, i.e. the reading without the
RES-operator:
(92) /rise again/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [ (∃ e0) (∃ s0) {e0
￿ e & s0 ￿ e0 & s ￿ e & s0: [[VERT x] = v0
i] & e0: [BECOME [[VERT
x] ≥ [v0
i + di]]] & s: [[VERT x] = vi]} [e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [v + d]]]]]
Asrequired, wegettwoindependentprocesses, withthewaterrising,fallingorsimplynotchang-
ing in between.
The most intriguing case is (88)(e), which has readings that are compatible with at least the
following conditions:
(93) a. The river rises again, after it didn’t change for a while.
b. The river rises again, after it was going down before.
In (93)(a), the presupposition triggered by again is most naturally met by a previous process of
rising, followed by an interval with no increase of water. This means that (93)(a) is an instance
43 Whether the repetitive interpretation is also available for (88)(c), can be left open here. Clearly the
restitutive reading is preferred for (c) and deﬁnitely blocked for (d).
44 Taking the more restricted presupposition discussed above as a kind of default interpretation for
comparative-like representations, we get (i) with a more perspicuous sequence of the four states in ques-
tion:
(i) λx λe [v, v0 | (∃ e0) (∃ s0) {e0
￿ e & s0 ￿ e0 & s ￿ e &
s0: [[VERT x] = v0] & e0: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [v0 + 2 FEET ]]] & s: [[VERT x] = v]} [e: [BECOME
[[VERT x] ≤ [v + 2 FEET]]]]]34 Presuppositions and Discourse
of repetitive interpretation of again. In other words, the VP rise again in (93)(a) must be that al-
ready spelled out in (92). A less prevalent reading of (93)(a) might however be compatible with a
situation where the steady period was preceded by the river’s going down. This would be a read-
ing that is explicitly required in (93)(a) and must hence be accounted for anyway, even though
it cannot be represented in (92), which relies on the repetitive again. As a matter of fact, the
presupposition of this reading must be compatible with the inverse process required by repetitive
again, as explicitly stated in (93)(b). The presupposition that (88)(e) requires independently of
the conditions added in (93) could presumably be paraphrased most plausibly as it was already
higher before. This seems to be the minimal conditionin order to justifythe requirement of again
– something that could be repeated in the process of rising, but still compatible with various con-
ditions in between, such as rising, falling, or steady height of waters, except that some falling
is logically necessary. Otherwise the river cannot get back from the earlier height. Could this
condition be derived by means of the restitutive reading of again? (94) shows the VP resulting
from this possibility:
(94) /rise again/ [+V, -N]
λx λe [ (∃ s0) {s0
￿ e & s ￿ e & s0: [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]] & s: [[VERT x] = vi]]} [e: [BECOME
[[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]]]]
What we’ve got here is the speciﬁcation of a target and two presupposed states, just as in (90)
for rise two feet again. The presupposition s0: [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]] is the automatic result of
applying the restitutive reading of again, and especially its operator RES, to the process reading
[e: [BECOME [[VERT x] ≥ [vi + di]]]] of rise, which in turn triggers the second presupposition
s: [[VERT x] = vi]]. Differing from (90), however, the target state as well as the presupposed
s: [[VERT x] = vi] in (94) are not states external to the process, but by deﬁnition part of and
dependent on the process, exactly as in (70)(c) for become higher. Now, this comment applies
equally to the presupposed state that again computes from the target of the process: It is not a
proper, external state that gets repeated, but a process-internal target. But whatever value one
might chose for vi, it is surpassed by the presupposition vi + di. Hence before the presupposition
that initiates the actual rising is met, the inverse process must take place, which makes (94)
compatible with the condition spelled out in (93)(b).
It seems that this analysis accounts neatly for the apparently vague intuition about the interpreta-
tion of (80)(e) The river rises again, which doesn’t seem to be restitutive in a clear sense at ﬁrst
glance, as it does not presuppose a deﬁnite state nor a process to return to. But it presupposes a
state holding before the actual rising of the river and correctly described by a bare comparative.
This however is precisely what the restitutive reading of again applied to the process reading of
“counterdirectionals” predicts. If this is correct, it supports the various assumptions introduced
independently in a non-trivial way.
The analysis furthermore seems to extend as expected to a wide range of related phenomena.
Thus comparativeswith BECOME create thesameprocess readings, evenifthey are notoriginally
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situation got more (and more) out of control, the weather became less friendly again45. Similarly
for other verbs “incorporating” BECOME plus comparative as in the colors graduallyfaded in the
sun, the road widened again, (due to the rain) slowly the grass grew again.
8 Loose Ends
Although the properties of BECOME have been explored extensively in various frameworks, it is
still worthwhile to take a closer look at its presuppositional structure. For one thing, even though
thechangetoatarget statestartingfromasourcethatimpliesthenegationofthetargetiscertainly
a deﬁnitional condition of BECOME, it is not a triviality that the source state is a presupposition.
It is one of the consequences of this fact, that in the very common cases of caused change as in
kill, clean, and the causative variants of all ergative verbs like break, open, etc. it is the BECOME-
component, rather than the causative operator CAUSE, that triggers the presupposition. This is
borne out, among other things, by the fact that causative verbs without the BECOME-component,
like turn as in the engine turned the wheel steadily do not have a presupposition of the relevant
type.
Interesting consequences of the presupposition triggered by BECOME show up if BECOME in-
teracts with other elements affecting the relevant conditions. The two cases we have explored in
more detail are the different effects of comparatives and the alternative readings of again, the
semantic contribution of which consists in nothing but an additional presupposition. While the
relevant representations have been spelled out in relevant detail, their systematic computation is
in need of further clariﬁcation in at least three respects.
The ﬁrst concerns the nature of implicit values of comparison, which show up in comparatives
and result in the process character in combinationwith BECOME. Notationally,“vi” is intended to
express the process-internal speciﬁcation of the value, but so far there is no independent mecha-
nism to specify and interpret the value. The stipulation seems to provide what is necessary. What
we do want, however, is a way to relate this stipulation to a more general account of values for
hidden variables. What comes to mind is the regime for implicit variables of complex tenses or
the conditions regulating deictic speciﬁcations in locative prepositions. But this is merely a loose
association with no substantive content to rely on.
To this problem, the second aspect in need of clariﬁcation is related. It concerns the way in
which the standard presupposition triggered by BECOME is restricted to the special condition
[DIM x = vi] instead of the more general [DIM x
￿ vi + di]. While it is always possible to satisfy
a presupposition by a more speciﬁc condition, the restriction in this case should be available for
independent motivation.This motivationhas to cope with the special status of di, by which DIM x
differs from vi. Intuitively,the value of “di” increases from 0 during each of the sub-eventualities
that can be chosen from the process in question, although no change of di needs to be explicitly
45 For some discussion of comparatives based on evaluative and other non-dimensional adjectives see
Bierwisch (1989), where it is claimed that the comparative of a non-dimensional predication [P x] intro-
duces a template Q, such that Q [P x] maps x wrt. P on a scale of comparison. Technicalities are to be left
aside here.36 Presuppositions and Discourse
represented. Here too, more general mechanisms, rather than an appropriate stipulation, should
eventually explain the source of the representations that seem to be intuitively correct.
Finally, I have considered again as lexically ambiguous between a restitutive reading with the
operator RES and a repetitive reading without it46. RES is intrinsically related to BECOME, distin-
guishing between two types of presupposition.47 What needs clariﬁcation, as already mentioned
in footnote 42, is the way in which the choice between repetitive and restitutive interpretation is
related to the location of nuclear stress and the possible syntactic position of the particle. Sim-
ilar, albeit different relations show up with particles like also and still. Whether these different
conditions and effects can be reduced to general mechanisms, remains to be seen.
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